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If the seller of a Treasury bill does not provide timely and 
correct delivery instructions to the clearing bank, the bank does not 
deliver the security.  Further, the seller is not paid until this 
"failed delivery" is rectified.  Since the purchase price is not 
changed,  these "fails" generate interest-free  loans from the seller to 
the buyer. 
This paper studies the effect of failed delivery on Treasury-bill 
prices.  We find that investors bid prices to a premium to reflect the 
possibility of obtaining the interest-free  loans that fails represent. 
This premium is a function of the opportunity cost of the fail.  We also 
find that the bid-ask  spread varies directly with the length of the 
fail.  We rule out the possibility that our results are due to liquidity 
premiums,  or to a general weekly pattern in short-term  interest rates or 
the bid-ask  spread. 
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This paper studies the impact of failed delivery on Treasury bill 
prices.  Failed delivery occurs if the seller does not give timely and 
correct delivery instructions to the clearing bank.  If the instructions 
are late, incorrect,  or incomplete,  the clearing bank does not make the 
transfer as scheduled.'  This constitutes failed delivery, or a "fail." 
Since it is the seller's responsibility to instruct the clearing 
bank to deliver the security to the buyer's account, the buyer need not 
make payment until the fail is corrected.  Yet, despite having made no 
payment,  he owns the security as of the promised delivery date;  when the 
fail is rectified, the price is not renegotiated.  In essence, the buyer 
obtains a zero-interest  loan for at least one business day if the seller 
fails to deliver,  but pays only the agreed-upon  price if the seller does 
deliver.  He may be forced to fail on a subsequent delivery of that same 
security,  but if so,  the zero-interest  loan he must make is offset by 
the zero-interest  loan he receives.  If the dealer correctly anticipates 
the fail,  he wins,  but even if he did not expect to be failed,  he is 
(approximately) even.  Buyers may be willing to pay extra for this 
possibility.  If so,  observed prices are bid up to reflect the 
possibility of fails. 
The effect of failed delivery is not trivial.  For example, if 
financing costs are at an annual rate of 10 percent, a seller who fails 
to deliver a $10 million Treasury bill loses more than $2,700.  If the 
fail is over a three-day  weekend, it cannot be rectified for four 
calendar days, costing the seller over $11,000.  If the buyer 
anticipates the fail,  he gains a like amount.  The prospect of earning 
such large sums leads many dealers to play various forms of the "fails 
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less than the value of their Treasury bill purchases,  relying on fails 
to cover the difference. 
We will argue that the length of the fail,  should it occur,  is 
variable and known at the time the order is placed.  This lets us 
conduct regression tests of its significance using the opportunity cost 
of the fail as an explanatory variable.  Since the delivery mechanism 
operates only when markets are open,  fails can  be corrected only when 
markets are open.  Market closings,  therefore, take on a special 
importance for our work. 
Although the United States Treasury's change to a book-entry  system 
for government securities has reduced the probability of fails,  the 
large sums involved with delivery failures remain an important issue 
among market participants.  However,  fails have not yet generated much 
interest in the literature.  This might be due to the relative lack of 
daily return data on debt securities.  The issue is still important for 
several reasons,  both from the perspective of regulatory policy and for 
our understanding of financial markets.  First, as noted above, fails 
generate transfers from losers of the fails game to winners.  Dealers in 
total neither win nor lose,  but very large transfers could conceivably 
wipe out a dealer's capital,  causing bankruptcy and market disruptions. 
Second,  Gilbert (1989) shows that fails contribute to the problem 
of daylight overdrafts,  which are intraday deficits incurred by a 
customer at his clearing bank, or by a bank with the Federal Reserve. 
To see how fails lead to daylight overdrafts,  consider a dealer who must 
make delivery on two orders by the end of the day,  one for $5 million 
and one for $25 million.  Suppose that at noon he has $10 million worth 
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immediately,  but instead will choose to wait until the last moment. 
This is because he may take delivery of other bills later that day.  If 
these deliveries amount to $15 million,  he can add it to the $10 million 
already in inventory and fill the $25 million order.  At worst,  he fails 
on the smaller trade.  If,  however,  he fills the $5 million trade early 
in the day,  receiving the $15 million order does him no good -- he still 
must fail on the $25 million order. 
Other market procedures combine with this practice to generate 
daylight overdrafts.  Securities financed via repurchase agreements 
(repos) are returned early in the day, and the clearing bank must 
transfer funds to the rep0 investor at that time.  Because funds are 
transferred from the dealers' accounts early in the day and because 
dealers deliver securities late in the day,  dealers must overdraw their 
accounts with their clearing banks by large amounts in the interim. 
Banks protect themselves by obtaining liens on the securities.  If the 
dealer becomes insolvent,  the bank takes the collateral. 
Because it involves only the clearing bank and the dealer, such an 
insolvency does not necessarily pose a problem for the Federal Reserve. 
However,  Gilbert (1989) points out that when the rep0 investor returns 
securities to the dealer early in the day and the clearing bank returns 
funds to that investor on behalf of the dealer,  the clearing bank's 
account with the Federal Reserve is overdrawn;  a daylight overdraft is 
created at the Federal Reserve.  Further, the funds transfer is final 
and cannot be reversed.  If the bank suffers large losses on its other 
assets and becomes insolvent,  the Federal Reserve has no claim on the 
securities transferred to the dealer in the morning, and loses on the 
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(and ultimately,  by taxpayers) is magnified by the dealer's  efforts to 
build inventory to avoid fails. 
A third reason fails are important is that daily return data using 
securities subject to failed delivery can show a systematic return 
pattern,  because the value of being failed varies systematically with 
the length of market closings.  If fails are ignored,  tests using these ' 
data may be biased.  Fourth,  if fails are priced, they contribute to the 
more general weekly pattern identified by Gibbons and Hess (1981) and 
Flannery and Protopapadakis (1988).  This also means tests of the 
importance of fails must control for a more general weekly pattern. 
Finally, fails can conceivably contribute to variation in the 
bid-ask  spread because they represent another source of risk for market 
makers: dealers often buy from one trader and sell the same security to 
another.  The dealer may receive delivery on time,  but too late in the 
day to deliver the security to the second trader, causing an expensive 
fail.  Under such circumstances,  dealers may not make a trade without a 
larger bid-ask  spread.  Because the cost of a fail is a function of its 
length,  we conjecture that the bid-ask  spread widens as the length of 
the potential fail increases.  Consistent with the view that fails are 
important,  the Federal Reserve has taken preliminary steps toward 
gathering data on delivery fails. 
This paper models Treasury-bill  holding-period  returns as a 
function of the expected return on an investment in federal funds during 
the holding period (an important alternative interest rate that is not 
subject to fails), and the expected opportunity cost during the length 
of time before a fail can be corrected.*  Use of the federal funds rate 
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helps control for a possible common state variable that might induce a 
general weekly pattern in short-term  rates.  The results do not, 
however, depend on the use of the federal funds rate.  Modeling bill 
returns as a function of the holding period and the length of the 
potential fail yields substantially similar results. 
Our results support the hypothesis that the marginal trader 
considers failed delivery.  Our estimate of the premium for fails is 
always significant,  even after controlling for differences in the weekly 
seasonal return pattern between Treasury bills and federal funds.  In 
addition,  we find that the bid-ask  spread does indeed widen when the 
dealer faces the prospect of a longer fail. 
The paper is organized as follows.  Section I develops our 
hypotheses.  Section I1 develops the model, linking the effect of failed 
delivery to market closings.  Section I11 describes the data and 
examines several empirical issues important to our tests.  Section IV 
reports the results.  Section V studies variation in the probability of 
fails,  while Section  VI studies the effect of fails on the bid-ask 
spread.  Section  VII provides a summary. 
I.  The Importance of Market Closings on the Day after Delivery 
Although investors who purchase securities for next-day  delivery 
obtain conditional title to those securities on the trade date,  payment 
in interest-bearing  funds does not occur until delivery.  These payment 
delays may be diagramed as follows: 
time  :  t  t+s  t+s+D  t+m 
event:  trade  scheduled delivery  next opportunity  bill matures 
(next business day)  to trade 
(second business day) 
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delivery on the next business day;  D is the number of calendar days 
between the scheduled delivery date (t+s) and the business day following 
that date;  and m is the maturity of the bill on the trade date. 
Our empirical tests use discount-rate  quotations obtained from Data 
Resources, Incorporated.  During the period we study,  a sample of 
dealers supplied these quotes to the Federal Reserve between 3:00 p.m. 
and 3:30 p.m.  Although an increasing proportion of Treasury-bill  trades 
are for cash,  or same-day  delivery, Fedwire closes for book-entry 
transfers before the quotes are collected.  Therefore,  securities traded 
at these rates are delivered the next business day.3  In the time 
diagram above, the bill is delivered and payment is due at t+s.  A fail 
at t+s cannot be corrected until t+s+D.  Therefore, D represents the 
minimum term of the potential interest-free  loan.  It is, therefore, 
crucial in identifying any possible impact of failed delivery. 
If delivery at t+s were certain,  Treasury bill prices would be 
unaffected by the value of D.  However,  delivery is not certain.  This 
gives D an appealing economic implication.  The seller must provide 
instructions to the clearing bank so that it can deliver the security to 
the buyer.  If the instructions are late or in any way unclear, the 
clearing bank does not make the transfer.  This means that the buyer of 
the security need not make payment until the fail is corrected. 
Nevertheless, payment procedures specify that he owns the security as of 
the promised settlement date.  In essence,  he obtains a zero-interest 
loan for at least one business day,  or D calendar days.  Clearly,  the 
possibility of correctly anticipating and collecting fails must be 
valuable to a dealer.  There is no penalty if he receives delivery on 
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buyers bid up observed prices to reflect this possibility. 
Dealers report that fails are a significant issue.  We contacted 
several dealers;  each claimed fails were important.  Most focused 
primarily on their efforts to avoid the cost of failing to make 
delivery,  but noted that the ability to correctly anticipate their 
customers' failures to deliver was a valuable skill.  And, although the 
proportion of failed trades is now (thanks to book-entry)  only 1  or 2 
percent, the sheer volume of trade makes the total impact substantial 
and worthy of study.  Stigum (1988) reports total fails to receive for 
one large dealer average $225 million per day,  while his fails to 
deliver average $200 million per day. 
Even if a dealer is not absolutely certain that he will be failed, 
it can be advantageous for him to take the risk of misguessing his 
position.  For example,  a dealer may have purchased 10  blocks of  bills 
of a given maturity, each worth $5 million.  Perhaps the dealer is 
reasonably sure that one of the blocks will fail;  he need not know  which 
of the 10.  He arranges financing for  only nine blocks in the relatively 
low-cost  rep0 market.  If  he is correct,  he need not finance the tenth 
block, effectively saving the entire cost of the tenth loan.  If, 
however,  he is incorrect and all 10  blocks are delivered,  the dealer 
must finance the tenth block at the bank's  loan rate,  which typically 
runs 100  basis points above the rep0 rate. 
Depending on the dealer's  confidence in predicting fails,  this may 
be an acceptable risk.  For example, at rat&  of 10  percent, the dealer 
can  be incorrect nine times out of 10 and still be ahead.  He loses 100 
basis points nine times,  but earns the entire financing rate -- 10 
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dealers enjoy still better odds.  Such dealers may have lines of credit 
at foreign banks that permit uncollateralized borrowing.  These dealers 
can typically obtain overnight funds late in the day for a smaller 
spread,  increasing the likelihood of winning their gamble.  Further, if 
two of the 10 blocks in the example fail rather than one, the dealer 
still wins the same amount.  He may be forced,  in turn,  to fail on one 
of his nine repos,  but his loss on this is offset by his gain in being 
failed.  In addition,  he still saves the entire financing cost of the 
tenth block. 
In terms of the time diagram above,  D represents the minimum time 
before markets reopen and a fail can be corrected.  Clearly,  a buyer 
prefers to be failed on Friday deliveries.  In this case,  a fail cannot 
be corrected for at least three calendar days;  he receives two extra 
days' worth of free financing.  Since the benefit of being failed is 
about three times as large on trades for Friday delivery, it follows 
that the premium, if any, is about three times as large.4  Similar 
forces operate if t+s falls before a holiday.  If the probability of 
collecting a fail is the same,  then the longer the time before a fail 
can be corrected, the more valuable that potential fail becomes: 
Treasury bill prices increase with D. 
In summary,  if fails are not priced or are too trivial to matter, 
the delay D has no effect on bill prices.  If,  however, fails are 
important,  then prices are an increasing function of D. 
11. The Model 
This section derives a pricing model that explicitly controls for 
the possibility that delivery may not be made on time.  We do this by 
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scheduled delivery date until the next business day into the return- 
generating equation for Treasury bills. 
We begin by defining PL as the observed price at t of a bill paying 
one dollar at maturity, if payment and delivery were certain to be made 
on the delivery date, t+s.  Note that although the bill is default-free, 
P'  is not par since the bill does not mature until t+m.  PL may be  t 
expressed as: 
p'  = p' 
t  t-n  x  ~XP[-I  x  Et-n(ffnt)  +  ~~1,  (1) 
where Et_n  is the expectations operator conditioned on information at 
t-n,  ffn  is the continuously compounded return on federal funds during  t 
the n days in the holding period observed at t,  7  is a constant (we 
relax this assumption later),  and E  is an error that incorporates 
information realized at time t.  Consistent with the time of our quotes, 
n is defined in terms of delivery dates.  For example,  buying on 
Thursday and selling on Friday generates a cash outflow on Friday and an 
inflow on Monday, so n equals three.  Although n depends on t,  we 
suppress the subscript t to simplify notation.  Also,  while observations 
are separated by varying numbers of calendar days, they represent 
consecutive trading days.  We use the federal funds rate because it 
responds rapidly to changes in economic conditions, is not subject to 
fails,  and is readily available.  Both PL and PL-, in  equation (1)  are 
observed prices if late-afternoon  quotes are directed at traders who 
deliver as scheduled with probability one -- with no chance of failed 
delivery. 
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prices.  To capture the effect of delivery failures,  we write P' as a  t 
function of the observed price at time t,  :  Pt 
PL = Pt x  exp(-S x  ffD ),  t  (2 
where ffDt is the continuously compounded return on federal funds during 
the D calendar days from t+s  to t+s+D, and S is a proportion.  The 
product (6 x  ffD )  is interpreted as the premium or rate of  price  t 
adjustment for fails during those D days.  We call this the fail 
premium. 
D is important  because it represents the number of days before a 
fail can be corrected.  In turn, the variable ffDt is the value,  per 
dollar, of a fail generated by trades made at time t.  The parameter 5 
represents the proportion of this value that a buyer pays as a premium 
for the possibility of obtaining an interest-free  loan for D days. 
Intuitively,  equation (2)  removes this quantity from the observed price 
by discounting at the market-determined  fail premium during the term of 
the loan. 
In Section V we study the possibility that the proportion of the 
return on federal funds during the D days in the potential fail period, 
6,  varies,  but here we assume it is constant.  Equation (2)  then  holds 
for any t and we can  write: 
-  P;-n  - pt_, x  exp(-6 x  ff~~-,).  (3) 
Substituting equations (2)  and (3)  into equation (1)  yields: 
Pt x  exp(-S x  ffDt) = 
't-n  x  exp(-S  x  ffDt-,)  X  exp[-y x  Et-n(ffnt)  +  et].  (4) 
Taking logs and rearranging,  we obtain: 
10g(P~/p~-~)  =  -y  x  E  (ffnt) + S x  AffDt +  ct,  t-n  (5) 
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exception of 7,  6,  and  E, all variables are observable.  Equation (5) 
says that the observed Treasury bill return depends on the return on an 
asset not subject to fails,  plus an adjustment for fails.  More 
precisely, it is a proportion of the expected return on an investment in 
federal funds during the holding period,  plus the difference in 
adjustments for potential fails, (6 x AffD ), plus an error term.  t 
Our primary regression test equation is,  therefore: 
l~g(P~/p~-~)  = b ffn  + b2AffDt + e  1t  t'  (6) 
In  this formulation,  bl estimates 7,  the average proportion of the 
federal funds rate earned by Treasury bill investors over the holding 
period in the absence of fails.  The coefficient b  estimates 6,  the  2 
average proportion of the federal funds return during the potential fail 
period that buyers pay sellers for the chance to collect fails. 
We expect b  to be positive: if the federal funds rate is high,  1 
bill returns tend to be high.  The null hypothesis that investors 
consider fails in pricing Treasury bills restricts the coefficient  b  2 to 
be positive: if the opportunity cost of today's potential fail is larger 
than yesterday's, prices are bid up more than yesterday's.  Measured 
returns tend to be high. 
111. Data, Preliminary Tests, and Empirical Issues 
A. Data 
The appendix contains a detailed description of the data.  The 
sample period extends from August 26,  1977 to September 28, 1989,  and 
includes 3,013  observations.  Quotes used in our tests are from Data 
Resources, Incorporated.  Maturities range from 27 to 35 days.  In the 
absence of holidays,  this uses the longest-maturity  bill when the fail 
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measured holding-period  returns when fails tend to decrease them,  and to 
decrease holding-period  returns when fails tend to increase them.  This 
insures that any liquidity premium biases our tests against finding that 
fails are important. 
B. Preliminary Tests 
An important empirical issue can  be traced to a common problem bond 
researchers face: we cannot be sure whether variation in the bid-ask 
spread affects our results.  If the spread is not constant  by day of the 
week, the use of ask,  bid,  or mean of bid-ask  quotes may not yield 
similar results.  To study this,  we estimate: 
Bidt -  Askt = bo + b d  + b2d2t + b3d3t + b d  +  e  1 It  4  4t  t'  (7) 
where Bid  and Ask  are discount quotes in percent and the dummy  t  t 
variables dlt through dqt control for the days of the week, excluding 
~uesda~.~  In this specification,  the intercept estimates the spread on 
Tuesday,  while the coefficients b  through b4  estimate deviatio.i,s  ~rom  1 
Tuesday's  spread on the other four days of the week.  We test the 
restriction that each coefficient on the dummy variables is zero using 
the heteroskedasticity-consistent  estimator due to White (1980). 
Table 1 shows that none of the coefficients differ statistically from 
zero.  Therefore,  we use the mean of the bid and ask quotes in all 
empirical work.  6 
Table 2 reports sample statistics.  Panel A gives the number of 
observations,  mean and variance for the variables in equation (6),  as 
well as for the length of the fail period itself,  D,  and the opportunity 
cost of a fail during D,  ffD.  Panel B gives the same statistics for the 
center-of-market  discount quote, (bid+ask)/2,  according the length of 
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reflect the possibility of collecting fails,  mean discount quotes 
decrease as D increases.  Although the rankings do not decrease 
monotonically,  much of the deviation from the expected rankings can be 
traced to the case in which D equals five.  This should have the lowest 
mean quote; in fact, it is the highest.  However,  one cannot have much 
confidence in this case because there are only two observations. 
Omitting these two observations,  the only deviation from the expected 
rankings is that the mean quote for the days on  which D equals one is 
larger than when it equals two.  We interpret this as providing some 
evidence that investors consider fails in pricing bills. 
C. Empirical Issues 
A potential problem with equation (6)  is that the dependent and 
independent  variables are simultaneously determined.  One solution is to 
use predicted values of the dependent variables.  The estimates below 
use this procedure.  We obtain predicted values of the continuously 
compounded daily federal funds rate by regressing them on the five most 
recent  values of the rate available at time t;  we then apply the 
predicted rate during,  respectively,  the n days in the holding period 
and the D days in the potential fail period. 
Another important empirical question relates to the time-series 
properties of the variables in equation (6).  Specifically,  we need to 
determine whether or not the variables are stationary.  If they are not, 
we must use models such as the error-correction  model of Engle and 
Granger (1987).  To study this we use the unit-root  tests of Perron 
(1988),  Phillips (1987),  and Phillips and Perron (1988).  To conduct 
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,nr 
Equation (8)  models the series without drift or time trend. 
Equation (9)  allows for drift,  and equation (10) permits both drift and 
time trend.  The tests for a unit root use the adjusted t-statistics 
"  * 
given in Perron (1988) for the parameters a,  a,  and a, denoted as z  (t:)  , 
Z(ta*),  and Z(t;),  respectively, rejecting the null hypothesis of a unit 
root for sufficiently small values of Z.  These tests require a 
consistent variance estimator;  we use the method of Newey and West 
(1987).  The estimates reported in Table 3 are for a truncation lag of 
five,  but the results are unchanged for other values of the truncation 
lag.  Critical values for the t-statistics  are given in Fuller (1976). 
For the 1 percent level,  these are -2.58,  -3.43,  and -3.96, 
respectively.  For all three variables, the adjusted t-statistics  are 
far below the critical values; we reject a unit root for all three 
series. 
Table 3 also reports the results of three joint tests for a unit 
*  * 
root.  Z(1)  tests the joint hypothesis of p  = 0,  a  =  1.  Z(2)  tests 
the joint hypothesis of  = 0,  B = 0,  a  =  1.  Z(3)  tests the joint 
- 
hypothesis of  B = 0,  a =  1.  The critical 1 percent levels given by 
Dickey and Fuller (1981) are 6.43,  6.09,  and 8.27,  respectively.  All 
estimated values are well in excess of these levels, confirming that the 
series are stationary.  This means we can use autoregressive 
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Engle and Granger (1987). 
IV. Results 
The results in Table 3 imply that the ordinary least squares 
residuals from equation (6)  are stationary.  Simple autoregressive 
specifications can,  therefore,  adequately capture the residual 
processes.  A parsimonious specification  that proves successful is an 
AR(6)  process with the second-,  third-,  and fourth-order  parameters 
constrained to equal zero.  Table 4  presents the results obtained by 
estimating equation (6),  along with the Box-Pierce  Q(j)  statistics and a 
test of the intercept restriction embodied in equation (6).  The Q(j) 
statistics test for an autoregressive or moving-average  process of order 
j  in the residuals.  These statistics are distributed chi-square  with j 
degrees of freedom.  For the Q(5),  Q(10),  and Q(15),  the 5 percent 
critical values are 11.07,  18.31,  and 25.00,  respectively.  None are 
significant. In addition,  none of the autocorrelations through lag 15 
are more than two standard errors from zero.  The intercept restriction 
implied by equation (6) holds.  ' 
A 
As expected, the coefficient on the federal funds variable, ffnt, 
is positive and highly significant.  The estimated coefficient is 0.883. 
This implies that investors in one-month  Treasury bills earned an 
average of 88.3  percent of the federal funds rate during the sample 
period. 
Table 4  also provides support for the hypothesis that buyers raise 
their bids to reflect the possibility of collecting fails.  We have 
argued that this should be more pronounced if scheduled delivery occurs 
before a market closing,  because then the fail could not be corrected as 
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b2,  which controls for changes in the opportunity cost of a potential 
fail,  is positive and significant,  with a t-statistic  of 7.39. 
This coefficient estimates the proportion of the federal funds rate 
built into the bill return for the possibility of collecting fails. 
This estimate is 0.0708.  This implies that investors bid up bill prices 
by 7.08 percent of the predicted federal funds rate.  Taking the funds 
rate as the financing cost,  this suggests a failure rate of about 7.08 
percent.  Conversations with dealers suggest that this is too high; the 
most common figure mentioned is 1 or 2 percent during our sample period. 
This suggests that the model expressed by equation (6) omits an 
important factor. 
In  particular,  we conjecture that Treasury bill holding-period 
returns are not a constant proportion of the federal funds rate.  Weekly 
return seasonality has been found in many assets; it is worth testing to 
see if the relationship between bill returns and returns on federal 
funds differs on any other days of the week.  To formally test this,  we 
regress the log of the price ratio on the return on an investment in 
federal funds during the holding period and interactive terms for 
Mondays,  Wednesdays, Thursdays,  and Fridays.  The coefficient on the 
federal funds investment measures the proportion of the funds rate that 
bill investors earn on Tuesdays.  The four interactive terms measure the 
deviation from Tuesday's  proportion earned by bill investors on those 
four days.  We then test the restriction that these coefficients are 
zero  with a chi-square  test using White's  (1980) heteroskedasticity- 
consistent  variance estimator. 
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23.06 for Wednesday, 14.00 for Thursday,  and 0.01  for Friday.  The tests 
for Monday and Friday are not significant at even the 15 percent level, 
but the other two are significant at the 1 percent level.  The results 
are the same using the usual t-tests. Therefore,  we include interactive 
terms for Wednesdays and Thursdays and estimate: 
where dgt is unity on Wednesdays and zero otherwise and d  is unity on  4t 
Thursdays and zero otherwise.  As in equation (6),  bill returns are a 
function of fails and the return on federal funds,  but equation (11) 
permits the proportion of the return on funds earned by bill investors 
to differ on Wednesdays and Thursdays. 
Table 5 reports the results.  All Q-statistics  are insignificant, 
and all autocorrelations (not shown) are within two standard errors of 
zero.  The intercept restriction  holds.  As expected, given the results 
of the chi-square  tests, the coefficients on the interactive terms for 
Wednesdays and Thursdays are significant.  The proportion of the federal 
funds rate that Treasury bill investors earn differs on Wednesdays and 
Thursdays.  The coefficient b2,  measuring the proportion of the federal 
funds rate paid as compensation  for fails, is smaller.  The point 
estimate of 0.0364 implies a delivery failure rate of about 3.64 
percent.  As noted above,  dealers report a failure rate of 1 or 2 
percent on  bills during our sample.  Given that the standard error of 
the estimate of b2 is 0.0118,  a formal t-test  fails to reject that our 
estimate falls well within this range. 
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is even closer to the failure rate that market participants report.  The 
estimated coefficient b2 is 0.0297,  for an implied failure rate of about 
2.97 percent. 
Our results do not depend on the use of the federal funds rate as a 
proxy for the opportunity cost of a fail.  We also estimate equation (6) 
without incorporating an interest rate proxy: 
~o~(P~/P~-~)  = blnt + b AD  +  et.  2t 
In this model,  bl estimates the daily holding-period  return on 
Treasury bills, and b2 estimates the rate of compensation for fails. 
Both are positive and significant,  implying delivery failure rates about 
the same as the regressions using an interest-rate  proxy.  These results 
are not shown for reasons of space,  but are available on request. 
V. Variation in the Probability of Fails 
The tests above assume that the probability of a fail is constant. 
This assumption may not be valid,  because rational sellers realize that 
multiday fails are more costly than single-day  fails.  Because they 
invest more resources in preventing multiday fails,  the probability of 
fails should decline as the length of the potential fail increases.  If 
preventing fails is progressively more costly,  the probability of fails 
should decline at a decreasing rate.  Although two-day  fails are twice 
as costly as one-day  fails,  one-day  fails are somewhat less than twice 
as likely as two-day  fails.  Treasury bill prices should be bid up at a 
progressively decreasing rate. 
One way to test this is to write: 
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P  = exp[-y ffm  +  -y  (d  xffm )  + -y3(dqtxffmt)  t  1t  2  3t  t 
A 
where ffm  is the predicted return on federal funds during the remaining  t 
maturity of the bill,  d3t and dqt are dummy variables for Wednesdays and 
Thursdays,  and ffDlt through ffD4t are the predicted opportunity costs 
for one-day  fails through four-day  fails,  respectively,  measured as the 
predicted return on federal funds during the fail.  For example, if Pt 
A 
is subject to a one-day  fail,  ffDlt is the predicted return during the 
A  A 
one-day  fail period and ffD2t through ffD4t are zero.  The variables 
(d  xffmt) and (dqtxffmt) are included based on the results in Table 5;  3t 
we expect -y2  and -y3  to be positive. 
Taking logs,  we obtain the regression equation: 
where the b estimate the corresponding  -y  or 6. 
In this regression,  b  should be negative, as increases in interest  1 
rates or the maturity of the bill lowers its price.  If fails are 
important, investors bid up bill prices at a decreasing rate as the 
opportunity cost of fails increases.  This means b  > b  > b6 > b7 > 0.  4  5 
Because we have only two observations with fails of five days,  we 
include them with four-day  fails. 
Table 6 contains the results.  As expected,  bl is negative and both 
b  and b  are positive.  The evidence concerning b  through b7 is mixed.  2  3  4 
The estimates have large standard errors and none approach conventional 
significance levels.  Also,  b5 and b6 are too high.  However,  given the 
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the coefficients are between, say,  0.01 and 0.02.  In addition,  the 
rankings of b  through b,  are almost exactly as predicted by the model:  4 
only b4  deviates from the expected rankings.  In addition,  all four 
coefficients are positive.  For independent coefficients,  the likelihood 
of this occurring is only 1/(24),  or 0.0625. 
One reason these results are inconclusive could be that buyers, as 
well as sellers,  alter their behavior as the opportunity cost of fails 
increases.  While sellers invest extra resources in attempts to prevent 
fails,  buyers may invest extra resources in attempts to cause fails. 
Dealers report that several factors contribute to the likelihood of 
fails occurring.  For example, although the Treasury bill market is 
among the most liquid in the world, some issues are less liquid than 
others.  Less-liquid  maturities are more likely to fail.  A buyer might 
attempt to generate a fail by purchasing a less-liquid  bill for same-day 
delivery shortly before Fedwire closes for securities transfers, or 
perhaps late in the day for next-day  delivery.  He may also place 
several small orders for a security.  Small deliveries are made last, 
and are more likely to miss the cutoff time for Fedwire.  The more 
valuable the fail,  the more likely dealers engage in such behavior.  If 
sellers invest increasing effort to prevent fails but buyers invest 
increasing effort to generate them,  the net effect on the probability of 
fails depends on the relative costs of preventing and generating fails. 
Other factors also influence the failure rate.  For example,  more 
fails occur if Fedwire closes on time,  both because dealers have less 
time to fix errors and because more deliveries miss the cutoff time. 
Although more liquid issues are less likely to fail,  heavy total trading 
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more work to do but no more time in  which to do it,  leading to more 
errors and congestion  on Fedwire.  Finally, improvements in technology 
should lead to fewer fails.  Given that trading volume increased 
dramatically during our sample while technology also advanced,  it is not 
possible to determine the net effect a priori.  We note, though,  that 
the Federal Reserve has taken preliminary steps to obtain information on 
delivery failure rates, indicating that problems remain. 
VI.  The  Effect of Fails on  the  Bid-Ask  Spread 
We have seen that dealers build inventory throughout the day to 
avoid fails on large trades.  What other aspects of dealer behavior 
might fails influence?  Consider a dealer who can simultaneously buy 
from trader A at a discount of,  say,  8.25  percent and sell to B at a 
discount of 8.00  percent.  If  delivery were certain,  this guarantees a 
profit for the dealer.  However,  suppose the dealer knows that A will 
deliver the security only moments before Fedwire closes for securities 
deliveries.  The dealer runs the risk of being unable to deliver.  the 
security to B on time.  The result could  be a costly fail,  wiping out 
the profit on the transaction.  Although the dealer appears to enjoy the 
elements of a perfect arbitrage -- buying and selling simultaneously at 
different prices -- he may not make the trades because the deliveries, 
although perhaps occurring within minutes, are not simultaneous,  adding 
risk to the transaction. 
We conjecture that this has two effects.  First,  it may affect 
trading volume.  The data do not permit testing this.  Second,  dealers 
may require larger expected profits on transactions if the potential 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmfail is longer.  To test this,  we regress the bid-ask  spread on a 
constant and the length of the potential fail: 
Bidt -  Askt = bo + b D  +  et.  It  (14) 
If the scenario above is true and dealers do require larger profits when 
the risk of fails is larger,  the spread should widen as D increases. 
The coefficient bl should be positive.  Since failing to make delivery 
amounts to making an interest-free  loan to the buyer, the spread should 
also be a function of the level of rates.  Therefore,  we also estimate: 
Bidt -  Askt = bo + b D  + b2qt + e  It  t'  (15 
where qt is the average of the bid and ask discounts at time t.  Table 7 
contains the results.  Consistent with our conjecture,  b  in equation  1 
(14) is indeed positive and significantly different from zero.  The 
t-ratio  is 2.06;  using a chi-square  test with White's (1980) 
heteroskedasticity-consistent  estimator, the statistic equals 4.00, 
which is also significant at the 5 percent level.  Equation (15) also 
supports the conjecture that dealers require larger spreads as the 
length of a potential fail increases.  Both bl and b2 are positive and 
significant.  This evidence in favor of fails is more persuasive when 
one recalls Table 1;  the variation in the spread cannot be attributed to 
some general weekly pattern,  because the spread does not depend on the 
day of the week in our sample. 
VII .  Summary 
This paper studies the effect of failed delivery on Treasury bill 
prices.  We find that Treasury bill prices reflect the value of being 
failed.  Prices increase if the scheduled delivery date falls before a 
market closing, lengthening the time before a fail can  be corrected.  We 
interpret this result as supporting the hypothesis that buyers compete 
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to be delivered before market closings.  Because sellers should invest 
progressively more resources to prevent fails as the opportunity cost of 
fails increases, the probability of fails should fall as the opportunity 
cost rises.  Tests of this are inconclusive: the four coefficients for 
the different opportunity costs of fails are not statistically 
significant,  but the ranks of their magnitudes are almost exactly as 
predicted,  and all four are positive,  as required by the theory. 
Finally,  we find that the bid-ask  spread widens as the length of a 
potential fail increases.  This is consistent with the interpretation 
that fails add another source of risk to a transaction. 
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1. These procedures are from Stigum (1983,  1988). 
2. Fails in physical securities are much more common than in book-entry 
securities.  However, it is much less reasonable to expect fails in 
physical securities to be corrected in one business day.  Therefore, 
we are unable to test for the effect of fails in such assets. 
3. We discuss this and the construction of our data in the appendix. 
4.  Sellers may well take extra care to avoid fails before weekends, 
reducing the premium to less than three times the usual amount. 
However, if progressively lowering the fail rate is increasingly 
costly,  the multiday premium must exceed the one-day  premium.  The 
comments of dealers were mixed: most reported that their employees 
were especially concerned with multiday fails,  but a few were 
compelled to constantly remind employees of the potential cost. 
5. The sample for this test extends from June 2,  1978  because DRI did 
not supply bid and ask quotes until then.  Prior to that date,  DRI 
reported only the average of the bid and ask quotes. 
6. We also conducted tests using bid-to-bid  and ask-to-ask  returns on 
different Treasury bill data from another source.  Although not 
reported here, the results are consistent with those reported  below 
using the mean of the bid and ask quotes. 
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Estimates obtained by regressing the spread between the bid and 
ask discount rates on an intercept and four dummy variables for the 
days of the week (Tuesday excluded). 
Full Sample: June 2,  1978 -  September 28,  1989. 
Number of observations: 2,825 
Parameter  Estimate 
(t-statistic) 
bl (Monday)  0.0047  0.253 
(0.50) 
b2 (Wednesday)  0.0078 
(0.85) 
b3 (Thursday)  0.016 
(1.73) 
b4  (Friday) 
Bid  =  the bid discount on day t,  in percent.  t 
Askt =  the ask discount on day t,  in percent. 
dit 
= dummy variables for the four business days of the week,  excluding 
Tuesday. 
The X2 tests the restriction that the dummy variables are zero using 
White's  (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent  estimator.  The test has 
one degree of freedom.  None of the values is significant at the 5 
percent level. 
**  Significant at the 1 percent level. 
The sample period begins on June 2,  1978 because DRI does not report bid 
and ask discount quotes until then. 
Source: Authors' computations. 
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Sample statistics 
Panel A: Sample statistics for Treasury bill holding-period  returns,  returns 
on an investment in federal funds during the holding period, the length of the 
fail period,  returns on an investment in federal funds during the fail period, 
and the change in returns on an investment in federal funds during the fail 
period. 
Full Sample: August 26,  1977 -  September 28,  1989. 
Mean  3.5665~10-~  4.0022~10-~ 1.466  4.  01x10-~  2.  OX~O-~ 
Variance  9 x  8 x  0.799  8x10-~  1.7x10-~ 
Number of 
observations  3,013  3,013  3,013  3,013  3,012 
Panel B:  Sample statistics for the average of the bid and ask discount quotes 
(percent) on Treasury bills for each length of the fail period. 
Number of days in 
the fail period,  D  1  2  3  4  5 
Variance  7.616  7.563  7.682  7.210  23.052 
Number of 
observations 
Ranking by mean  3  2  4  5  1 
Ranking by mean,  2  1  3  4  --- 
excluding D=5 
Pt 
=  the price of the Treasury bill at time t. 
n  =  the number of calendar days in the holding period. 
ffnt =  the return on an investment in federal funds during the holding period 
at time t. 
Dt 
=  the length of the fail period at time t. 
ffDt  = the opportunity cost of a fail at t. 
AffDt  =  the change in the opportunity cost of a fail from t-n  to t. 
Source: Authors' computations. 
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Phillips-Perron  tests for a unit root. 
Full Sample: August 26,  1977 -  September 28,  1989. 
Number of observations: 3,013 
A  A 
For y  t =  l~g(p~/P~-~)  For y  t = ffnt  For yt = AffDt. 
Pt 
=  the price of the Treasury bill at time t. 
n  =  the number of calendar days in the holding period. 
A 
ffn  =  the predicted value of the return on an investment in federal funds 
during the holding period. 
A 
AffD  =  the predicted value of the change in the opportunity cost of a fail 
from t-n  to t. 
The Z(t)  statistics test the hypothesis that the corresponding adjusted 
t-ratio  differs from unity.  These adjusted statistics are given in Perron 
(1988).  The critical one percent values given by Fuller (1976) are -2.58, 
-3.43,  and -3.96  for ~(t:),  Z(tQ*),  and Z(t--),  respectively.  Z(1)  tests the 
*  * 
joint hypothesis of p  = 0,  a  = 1.  Z(2)  tests the joint hypothesis of  = 0,  -  -  - 
,6'  = 0,  a  = 1.  Z(3)  tests the joint hypothesis of B = 0,  a  =  1.  The critical 
one percent values given by Dickey and Fuller (1981) for these tests are 6.43, 
6.09,  and 8.27,  respectively.  All statistics use the variance estimator given 
by Newey and West (1987).  The truncation lag is 5 for the estimates given, 
but other values for the truncation lag give similar results. 
** Significant at the 1 percent level. 
Source: Authors' computations. 
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Estimates obtained by regressing Treasury bill holding-period  returns on 
the predicted return on federal funds over the holding period and the 
change in the predicted value of the opportunity cost of a fail from 
t-n  to t,  corrected for autocorrelation. 
(Average of bid and ask rates) 
Full Sample: August 26, 1977 -  September 28, 1989. 
Number of observations: 3,013 
Parameter estimate 
(t-statistic) 
Test of the 
intercept restriction 
Pt 
= the price of the Treasury bill at time t. 
n  =  the number of calendar days in the holding period. 
A 
ffnt =  the predicted return on federal funds during the holding period at t 
A 
AffD. =  the predicted value of the change in the opportunity cost of a fail 
from t-n  to t. 
The Q(j)  statistics are the Box-Pierce (1970) statistics for an 
autoregressive or moving average process of order j.  These statistics are 
distributed chi-square  with j degrees of freedom. 
** Significant at the 1 percent level. 
Source: Authors' computations. 
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TABLE  5 
Estimates obtained by regressing Treasury bill holding-period  returns on the 
predicted return on federal funds over the holding period, the change in the 
predicted value of the opportunity cost of a fail from t-n  to t,  and 
interactive variables controlling for the divergence between the proportion of 
the federal funds rate earned by Treasury-bill  investors on Wednesdays and 
Thursdays compared to other days of the week,  corrected for autocorrelation. 
(Average of bid and ask rates) 
Full Sample: August 26,  1977 -  September 28, 1989. 
Number of observations: 3,013 
10g(P~/q~-~)  = blffnt + b2AffDt + b  3  (d  3t  xffnt) + b  4  (d  4t  xffn  t  )  + e  t' 
Parameter estimate 
(t-statistic) 
Test of the 
intercept restriction 
Pt 
=  the price of the Treasury bill at time t. 
n  =  the number of calendar days in the holding period. 
A 
ffn  =  the predicted return on federal funds during the holding period at t.  t 
A 
AffDt  = the predicted change in the opportunity cost of a fail from t-n  to t. 
d3t  =  unity on  Wednesdays and zero otherwise. 
dqt  =  unity on Thursdays and zero otherwise. 
The Q(j)  statistics are the Box-Pierce  (1970) statistics for an autoregressive 
or moving average process of order j.  These statistics are distributed chi- 
square with j  degrees of freedom. 
** Significant at the 1 percent level. 
Source: Authors' computations. 
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TABLE  6 
Estimates obtained by regressing the log of Treasury bill prices on 
the predicted return on federal funds over the maturity of the bill, 
interactive terms for Wednesdays and Thursdays,  and the predicted 
return on an investment in federal funds during the length of the 
potential fail,  corrected for autocorrelation. 
(Average of bid and ask rates) 
Full Sample: August 26,  1977 -  September 28,  1989. 
Total number of observations: 3,013 




= the price of the Treasury bill at time t. 
A 
ffmt  = the predicted return on federal funds during the maturity of the bill 
at time t. 
d3tj  dqt = dummy variables for Wednesdays and Thursdays,  respectively. 
A  A  A  A 
ffDlt,  ffD2t,  ffD3t,  ffD4  = the predicted return on federal funds during  t 
the length of a fail at time t (fails of five days are included with 
fails of four days because only two exist in the sample). 
**  Significant at the 1 percent level. 
Source: Authors' computations. 
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Tests for variation in the bid-ask  spread: 
Full Sample: June 2,  1978 -  September 28,  1989. 
Number of observations: 2,825 
Parameter  Estimate  X  X  2  Estimate  2 
(t-statistic)  (t-statistic) 
Bid  = the bid discount on day t,  in percent.  t 
Askt = the ask discount on day t,  in percent 
Dt 
= the number of days in the fail period on day t. 
qt 
= the average of the bid and ask discount rates on day t,  in 
percent. 
The X2 tests the restriction that the dummy variables are zero using 
White's  (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent  estimator.  The test has 
one degree of freedom. 
* Significant at the 5 percent level. 
**  Significant at the 1 percent level. 
The sample period begins on June 2,  1978 because DRI does not report bid 
and ask discount quotes until then. 
Source: Authors' computations. 
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Appendix 
This appendix describes the data.  The first important issue is the 
proper delivery procedure for our sample.  Regular delivery is the next 
business day.  Nevertheless, an increasing portion of Treasury bill 
trades are for same-day  delivery.  Further clouding the matter is that 
reported yields (not the quotes used in this paper) can be considered to 
be for skip-day  delivery,  two business days from the quote date.  To 
resolve this problem we contacted several traders.  All agreed that 
although delivery is negotiable and extremely flexible,  quotes collected 
between 3:00 and 3:30  p.m. are much too late in the day to be for same- 
day delivery.  Despite the common practice of reporting yields based on 
skip-day  delivery,  not one trader considered the quoted discount rates 
themselves to be for skip-day  delivery. 
To confirm this,  we contacted the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 
which supplies the quotes to DRI.  The bank reported that it first 
collects the discount quotes from dealers,  which are for next-day 
delivery at the time they are collected.  However, the bank assumes 
skip-day  delivery to compute the reported yield.  This convention likely 
evolved to meet the needs of the print media,  which obtain the data the 
evening they are collected and publish them the following morning. 
Investors purchasing bills that day (for next-day  delivery) would 
therefore receive the bill the second day after the data were originally 
collected.  The important point is that the delivery date assumed in the 
yield calculation (skip-day) does not reflect the actual delivery date 
(next-day)  . 
We convert quoted rates to prices using the usual formula, 
P  = 1 -  [qt  *  (mt-  st)/36000],  t 
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and (m-s)  is the number of days -from  the promised delivery date until 
maturity.  These prices are then used to compute log-price  ratios for 
the test equations.  Maturities range from 27 to 35 days.  We choose 
this maturity range for several reasons.  First, it approximates one 
month, the maturity often used as the proxy for the riskless rate.  In 
addition,  this minimizes problems with differential seasoning,  causes 
Monday's maturity to be as near the mean as possible,  and causes any 
term premium to bias our tests against finding an effect due to fails. 
To verify that the time series of Treasury bill prices is as accurate as 
is possible, we use numerous manual and computer procedures.  A complete 
listing of these is available from the authors. 
We illustrate the construction of the data by describing a week 
unaffected by holidays.  Monday's holding-period  return is computed 
using Friday's price on a 34-day  bill and Monday's price on that same 
bill,  which has 31 days until maturity on Monday.  Tuesday's return uses 
Monday's and Tuesday's prices on the same bill (which has 30 days until 
maturity on Tuesday), and Wednesday's  return uses Tuesday's and 
Wednesday's prices on the same bill.  Thursday's return is the last one 
using this same bill,  representing the return on a bill with 28 days 
until maturity at the end of the holding period.  Friday's return uses a 
new  bill (maturing a week later), with 35 days until maturity on 
Thursday and 34 on Friday.  Thus,  any liquidity premium would cause 
Thursday's average return to be the lowest and Friday's to be the 
highest.  Since fails would cause exactly the opposite result in the 
absence of holidays,  constructing the data in this way biases our tests 
against finding that fails are important. 
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This approach offers two advantages over assuming a locally flat 
term structure and using yields to compute implied prices.  First, our 
method need not impose any specific shape on the yield curve.  More 
important,  our method obtains returns that actually could have been 
earned by investors.  This is not the case using implied prices,  which 
sometimes use yields on two different securities to calculate returns. 
Flannery and Protopapadakis (1988) discuss these return  measures. 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm